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Entrepreneurship in Peace Operations
NANCY C. ROBERTS
Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
ABSTRACT A central question guides this article: To what extent can entrepreneurship be a force for
change and transformation in war-torn areas? To address the question, this article introduces the topic
of social entrepreneurship and illustrates how social entrepreneurs are serving as change agents in
rebuilding and reconstructing areas devastated by conflict. The social enterprise of Kiva, the
brainchild of social entrepreneurs Matthew Flannery and Jessica Jackley, provides an example. It
is notable for its innovative idea—a Web-based, internet-facilitated micro-loan process that attracts
individual investors worldwide in support of business entrepreneurs in the developing world. As a
counter example to top-down, mandate-driven, organization-centric intervention strategies that
many organizations pursue in peace operations, Kiva’s enduring legacy may very well be its
bottom-up, entrepreneur-driven, network-centric model of change. Its most salient features are: a
supply chain that ‘contractually’ connects all the partners in the loan process to minimize
coordination problems and ensure that each step in the workflow sequentially adds value; processes
and systems that guarantee work is transparent, efficient and accountable; a model of learning that
enables global and local partners to co-create a complex, worldwide community-based learning
system in support of entrepreneurship; and a rich network of social relations built from face-to-face
and online interactions to help generate social capital needed for development.
KEY WORDS: Social entrepreneurship, innovation, post-conflict reconstruction and development,
peace operations
Pathwalker, there is no path. You must make the path as you walk.
Antonio Machado
Introduction
Entrepreneurship is a well-examined and researched concept both in terms of its theory and
practice (Casson et al., 2008; Kuratko, 2008). Studies of individual entrepreneurs—their
motivations, actions, and achievements—have been pursued in disciplines ranging from
economics to management in both the private and public sectors (Bolton & Thompson,
2004; Roberts & King, 1996). Despite in-depth explorations in a range of settings,
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entrepreneurship is a relatively undeveloped topic in peace operations,1 which is not
surprising since peace operations are some of the most difficult arenas in which to work.
The literature documents evidence of failure more than it does success (Crocker,
Hampson & Aall, 1999; Jett, 1999; Schmidl & Oakley, 2000; Thakur & Schnabel, 2001).
Although entrepreneurship thrives in other contexts, the question posed in this article is
whether entrepreneurship could be a source of creativity, change, and transformation
during peace operations. Is it possible to envision entrepreneurship as a source of vitality
and renewal in some of the most difficult and challenging leadership and management
settings? At first glance, higher levels of conflict,2 physical and psychological violence,
destruction of infrastructure (i.e. roads, bridges, communications, monetary, and banking
systems), fragmented civil society, poorly functioning government, and complex coordi-
nation challenges among the nation builders are all factors likely to inhibit risk taking,
limit collaboration, and weaken the foundations on which entrepreneurship is said to
grow (Casson et al., 2008; Kuratko, 2008). On the other hand, drawing on the talents and
inventiveness for which entrepreneurs are renowned, where is entrepreneurship more
needed than in areas torn by conflict that have to be reconstructed after the scourge of war?
My exploration of entrepreneurs in peace operations begins in the first section with a
generic framework of entrepreneurship and innovation. Basic issues first need to be
addressed. What is entrepreneurship? Who are entrepreneurs and how do we distinguish
them from others? What makes entrepreneurs unique in terms of their motivations,
actions, and accomplishments? Building on this framework, the second section explores
the extent to which entrepreneurship is viable under the difficult and challenging con-
ditions of peace operations. It introduces a new type of entrepreneur emerging from the
non-profit sector referred to as social entrepreneurs.3 Social entrepreneurs believe entre-
preneurship is a vital component in any renewal effort. Their intent is to combine the
results-oriented methods of a business entrepreneur with the goals of a social reformer
to create new social enterprises for the purpose of improving society rather than generating
economic value for investors or customers (Bornstein, 2004; Dees, 2001; Drayton, 2006;
Light, 2008; Mair, Robinson & Hockerts, 2006; Nicholls, 2006). Social enterprises are
different from business enterprises in that they have a social purpose, such as mitigating
or reducing social problems or market failures like poverty and homelessness. As such,
they hold themselves accountable to community stakeholders rather than financial share-
holders. And despite their fundamental aim to generate social value, social entrepreneurs
nonetheless are expected to operate with the financial discipline, innovation, and determi-
nation of a private-sector business (Bornstein, 2004; Dees, 2001; Drayton, 2006; Light,
2008; Mair, Robinson & Hockerts, 2006; Nicholls, 2006).
The third section describes one well-known example of social entrepreneurship—the
social enterprise of Kiva. The case illustrates how Kiva’s founders, similar to their compa-
triots in business and government, fit the generic framework of innovation and entrepreneur-
ship. Their goal is to find and then support would-be local business entrepreneurs who
then can be catalysts for renewal and reconstruction in areas devastated by disasters and
conflict. Although the evidence from Kiva and other social enterprises is suggestive
rather than conclusive, it points to entrepreneurship as a potential source of creativity,
change, and transformation in peace operations. Future research will be required to ascertain
how widespread social entrepreneurship is and the more specific conditions under which it
can flourish. From this initial vantage point, however, it is possible to discern the basic
outlines of a new intervention model that merits future study: in-country organizational
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partners that act as brokers who identify would-be business entrepreneurs needing assist-
ance; prospective entrepreneurs, partner-vetted and selected, who then publish their business
plans on the Kiva website to attract donors; and a worldwide network of interested donors
who provide much-needed capital and person-to-person advice on how to start and sustain
businesses. In stark contrast to the top-down, mandate-driven, organization-centric interven-
tion strategies characteristic of many organizations engaged in peace operations (Holohan,
2005; Roberts & Bradley, 2005), Kiva and its founding social entrepreneurs demonstrate an
alternative model of change that represents a growing trend in reconstruction and develop-
ment work: a bottom-up, entrepreneurial-driven, worldwide, network-centric model for
rebuilding and reconstructing areas devastated by poverty and war (Brecher & Costello,
1998; Eberly, 2008; Narayan, Pritchett & Kapoor, 2009).
Generic Framework of Entrepreneurship and Innovation
Entrepreneurship has a long lineage. As a well-established concept in business and govern-
ment, it has appeared in many guises in its 150 year history. Despite the multiplicity of
definitions in the literature, there is general agreement that those who start up new,
innovative organizations in the private sector are business entrepreneurs (Drucker,
2006). Those in the public sector who establish new public organizations are considered
to be executive entrepreneurs (Lewis, 1980; Roberts, 1992; Roberts & King, 1996), and
those who craft new ideas and implement them as innovative public policy are referred
to as policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1984; Roberts, 1992; Roberts & King, 1996).
A fundamental understanding of entrepreneurship, whether it is business or public-
sector entrepreneurship, begins with the innovation process. Innovation is the translation
of a new idea from its initial state to its actualization in practice as a full-blown innovation.
The innovation process begins with a new idea (Schroeder et al., 2000). The idea can be
a new technology, a new service, a new product, or even a new administrative procedure
or process (Daft & Becker, 1978). Classification of an idea as ‘new’ depends on its context.
An idea is considered to be new if it is perceived to be new by the relevant unit of adoption
(Zaltman, Duncan & Holbek, 1973, p. 10). Sometimes new ideas originate in a particular
setting. In other instances, a new idea is adapted or even borrowed from another setting
and then applied in the entrepreneur’s own context (Peltz & Munson, 1982).
The development of the new idea and the association of the idea with some need,
problem, or concern mark the first phase of the innovation process, often referred to as
initiation or creation (Polsby, 1984; Roberts, 1992; Roberts & King, 1996). Initiation is
followed by the design phase that translates the idea into a more concrete and tangible
form (such as a prototype, model, or position paper). Completion of the design phase
requires the approval of powerholders and gatekeepers whose resources and support are
necessary to proclaim the new idea as a new invention, law, statute, policy, or program.
Implementation follows the design phase when the new idea is tested in practice to
ascertain how well it functions. New ideas that survive implementation are described as
innovations; ideas that do not survive are considered to be failed ideas (Roberts, 1992;
Roberts & King, 1996). Institutionalization is the final phase when the new idea
becomes accepted practice. Thus, we can think of the innovation process consisting of
a series of hurdles or transformations that move the new idea from an initial state to its
final state. The horizontal dimension in Figure 1 represents the process graphically.4
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The vertical dimension in Figure 1 represents the entrepreneurial process. Entrepreneurs
are the creators and drivers of the innovative idea as it moves through time. In order to
push their ideas forward, they engage in a set of activities to protect their ideas and
give them shape and form. The range of their activities can be extensive depending on
how well known the idea is, how much resistance there is to it, and the level of support
it attracts. One way to think of the vertical dimension is to view it as representing an entre-
preneurial activity structure. Box 1 illustrates the activity structure of a group of public
entrepreneurs who were advocating radical policy change in the public schools. Four
basic categories subdivided their activities: creative/intellectual activities, strategic activi-
ties, mobilization and execution activities, and administrative and evaluative activities.
The public entrepreneurs engaged in each set of activities individually and collectively
throughout the innovation process. Taken a whole, the activities resulted in a relational
field of energy to protect the new idea, defend it against its detractors, and nurture it
through the vagaries of the innovation process.5
The innovative idea vector and the entrepreneurial vector are interrelated. They work in
tandem to produce innovation. The innovation vector tracks the various manifestations of
the new idea (idea, prototype, innovation) as it moves through the processes of initiation,
design, implementation, and institutionalization. The unit of analysis of the innovation
process is the new idea. The entrepreneurial vector tracks the agents of change who gal-
vanize support for and counter resistance to the innovative idea as it moves through time.
The unit of analysis for the entrepreneurial process is the entrepreneur and the relational
network of activities he/she develops in support of the innovative idea (Roberts, 1992,
2007; Roberts & King, 1996).
This model provides several conceptual advantages. First, it enables us to distinguish
between entrepreneurship and innovation. While related, entrepreneurship and innovation
are two different processes. Entrepreneurs are the necessary but not sufficient element for
innovation to occur. Their creativity and initiative spark the development of new ideas.
They are the catalysts that propel the innovative idea forward and mould and shape it
through the innovation process. At the same time, entrepreneurs fail or succeed to the
extent their ideas attract support and resources from others. At some point, the innovative
idea takes on a life of its own and has to be treated as separate from the entrepreneur who
Figure 1. Processes of entrepreneurship and innovation.
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Box 1. Activity structure of public entrepreneurs
Creative/intellectual activities
(1) Generate ideas
invent new policy ideas
apply models and ideas from other policy domains
(2) Define problem and section solution
define performance gap
identify preferred solution alternative
(3) Disseminate ideas
Strategic activities
(1) Formulate grand strategy and vision
(2) Evolve political strategy
(3) Develop heuristics for action
Mobilization and execution activities
(1) Establish demonstration projects
(2) Cultivate bureaucratic insiders
(3) Collaborate with high-profile individuals/elite groups
(4) Enlist elected officials
(5) Form lobby groups and coordinate efforts
(6) Cultivate media attention and support
Administrative and evaluative activities
(1) Facilitate programme administration
(2) Participate in programme evaluation
gave it life. In fact, the ideal situation is when others begin to call the innovative idea their
own. Thus, the entrepreneur and the innovative idea need to be treated as two related but
conceptually distinct entities.
The model also enables us to distinguish between entrepreneurs and others involved in the
innovation process. In contrast to others whose participation is limited to one or two phases,
entrepreneurs are engaged in all three phases of the innovation process from the idea’s cre-
ation to its design and implementation (Roberts, 1992; Roberts & King, 1996). We see in the
lower half of Figure 2 an example drawn from the public policy arena (Roberts, 1992;
Roberts & King, 1996). In the case of public school choice, policy intellectuals generated
a new policy idea and defended it against alternative definitions and solutions to social pro-
blems. Policy intellectuals often worked with policy advocates who extolled the idea’s
virtues because they believed it would solve some problem or meet some need. Policy advo-
cates, in turn, served as a bridge between policy intellectuals and policy champions—those
who hold elected office. Capitalizing on their prestige, visibility, and resources, policy
champions then introduced the idea to the public and worked the seams of government to
secure its expression in law, statute, or policy. Once the new idea was established in law,
statute, or policy, policy administrators then recommended ways to implement it and
increase its acceptance into the field. Finally, policy evaluators suggested appropriate
means to ensure the idea received a fair review based on its merits.
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The entrepreneurship–innovation model also enables us to make finer-grained distinc-
tions between individual and collective forms of entrepreneurship. Individual entrepre-
neurship relies on the exploits of a single individual who works through all phases of
the innovation process. Acting independently, she generates a new idea, creates its
design, and oversees its translation and implementation into practice. In contrast, collec-
tive entrepreneurship draws on multiple people to husband and shape an idea through
initiation, design, and implementation into a full-blown innovation (e.g. intellectuals,
advocates, champions, administrators, and evaluators) as shown in Figure 2. Probing col-
lective entrepreneurship more deeply, we find its expression can take one of two forms:
team entrepreneurship or functional entrepreneurship (Roberts, 1992, 2007; Roberts &
King, 1996). Team entrepreneurship occurs when multiple entrepreneurs join forces
and work together to push an idea through all phases of the innovation process. Although
each person is an entrepreneur in his own right, all decide it is more advantageous to pool
their resources and act in concert with other entrepreneurs. Functional entrepreneurship,
on the other hand, occurs without the presence of a single entrepreneur. It occurs when
experts from different functional areas of expertise coordinate their efforts and resources
in order to push a new idea into practice (Roberts, 1992, 2007; Roberts & King, 1996).
Entrepreneurship in Peace Operations?
In principle, there is nothing in the generic model of entrepreneurship and innovation
summarized above that prevents entrepreneurship during peace operations, whether in
its individual or collective, team or functional, public or private form. Practice,
Figure 2. Collective entrepreneurship.
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however, is a different matter. Central to the consideration of entrepreneurship in peace
operations is the issue of security. No matter what phase of peace operations (Brahimi,
2000), conflict threatens lives, disrupts businesses and communities, destroys critical
infrastructure necessary to support development, fragments civil society, and ruptures
the delicate bonds that generate social capital needed for rebuilding (Holohan, 2005;
Kreimer et al., 2000). Most all contemporary and historical examples of entrepreneurs
come from relatively stable contexts (Bolton & Thompson, 2004; Casson et al., 2008).
Thus, most evidence suggests that entrepreneurs tend to operate in regions of the world
where people have some hope in the future, governments exist and at least do not discou-
rage risk taking and innovation, and collaborative social networks generate needed capital
and support.
On the other hand, despite limited references to entrepreneurs in conflict-ridden zones, it
is reasonable to assume that the same services they provide under stable conditions are
desperately needed during peace operations. People need innovative ways to rebuild
their homes, businesses, and civil society. Reconciliation and reintegration of former
belligerents into society requires the regeneration of social capital to rebuild community
relations. What greater test could there be for entrepreneurs who are reported to thrive
on challenge? Apparently some have heard the sirens’ call. Despite the volatile security
situation after the US invasion of Iraq, Iraqi entrepreneurs were applying for and receiving
micro-loans to start new businesses.6 And these are not its first in war-torn areas. Micro-
loans have been given to borrowers in Afghanistan, Gaza, The Democratic Republic of
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Cambodia, Vietnam, and
Tajikistan (see Note 6), all areas which have experienced recent peace operations.7
These loans to business entrepreneurs have been facilitated by a new breed of entre-
preneurs—social entrepreneurs. Unlike other types of entrepreneurs (Roberts, 1992;
Roberts & King, 1997), social entrepreneurs typically hail from the non-profit sector
and are dedicated to creating social transformation and change (Bornstein, 2004; Dees,
2001; Drayton, 2006; Leadbeater, 1996; Light, 2008; Mair, Robinson & Hockerts,
2006; Martin & Osberg, 2007; Nicholls, 2006). Their purpose is social—to mitigate or
reduce social problems that governments and markets have failed to address such as
poverty and homelessness. Accountable to community stakeholders rather than financial
shareholders, their aim is to generate social value while at the same time operating with
the financial discipline, innovation, and determination of a private-sector business (Born-
stein, 2004; Dees, 2001; Drayton, 2006). As social entrepreneur, Bill Drayton, founder of
Ashoka, characterizes them: ‘social entrepreneurs are not just content to give a fish or to
teach how to fish. They will not rest until they have revolutionized the fishing industry’.8
Apparently, peace operations afford them the opportunity to tackle seemingly intractable
problems and at the same time pursue large-scale change that is their hallmark.
The term social entrepreneurship appears to have been used originally in The Sociology
of Social Movements to describe Robert Owen, a Welsh utopian socialist and social refor-
mer who is considered to be the father of the cooperative movement (Banks, 1972). The
concept gained traction in the 1980s and 1990s with the work of Bill Drayton who in 1981
founded the non-profit organization Ashoka: Innovators for the Public (see Note 8).
Ashoka, meaning ‘the active absence of sorrow’ in Sanskrit, is based on the premise
that the most effective way to promote positive social change is to invest in social entre-
preneurs—those who combine the pragmatic and results-oriented methods of the business
entrepreneur with the innovative solutions of social reformer. Drayton’s non-profit
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organization searches worldwide for innovative leaders and provides them with ‘social
venture capital’ to assist them in actively transforming societies by creating a global,
entrepreneurial, and competitive citizen sector.
A well-known contemporary social entrepreneur and an Ashoka fellow is Muhammad
Yunus. He developed the strategy of micro-credit—the extension of small loans to entre-
preneurs too poor to qualify for traditional bank loans. He and the Grameen Bank, a social
enterprise he founded, were jointly awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 ‘for their efforts
to create economic and social development from below’ (Nobel Foundation, 2006, italic
added). His work demonstrates a theme among modern-day social entrepreneurs—there
are great benefits to be gained when business principles are combined with social ventures
to promote social transformation from the bottom-up.
The emergence of social entrepreneurs has prompted questions in the general entrepre-
neurship literature. What exactly is a social entrepreneur and how are they similar or
different from business and public entrepreneurs (Austin, Stevenson & Wei-Skillern,
2006; Goldstein, Hazy & Silberstang, 2009; Martin & Osberg, 2007; Moir & Marti,
2006; Pariyar & Ward, 2005)? At this stage, there is little agreement in answer to these
questions beyond the general descriptions summarized above; definitions vary from
country to country and author to author (Alter, 2006; Goldstein, Hazy & Silberstang,
2009; Nicholls, 2006; Soderborg, 2004).9 The remainder of the paper focuses on two
social entrepreneurs and their social enterprise—Kiva. Its purpose is to sponsor business
entrepreneurship in war-torn and developing regions throughout the world. With this
important example, and others like them, we have a growing body of evidence to
suggest that even in areas where conflict renders the social fabric, there is fertile ground
for entrepreneurship.
The Case of Kiva: A Social Enterprise10
Kiva, meaning ‘agreement’ or ‘unity’ in Swahili, is a 501(c)(3) non-profit public benefit
corporation registered in the State of California, USA. It was born out of Matthew Flan-
nery and Jessica Jackley’s combined professional interests, experiences, and expertise in
Africa. Observing a number of enterprising individuals who had creative ideas on how to
expand or start new businesses, but only lacked the needed capital, they asked: How can
we lend money to rural African entrepreneurs to help start their businesses? After a year of
research and exploration, they found no high-engagement way to do this. Although they
knew of microfinance institutions lending money to the poor, none allowed direct
contact from lenders to borrowers. Despite the many legal and business questions that
remained unanswered after their year-long study, they decided to risk launching an exper-
iment. In March 2005, Kiva began raising loans for seven businesses in Uganda. Zadock
Moses Onyango became their field coordinator and administered the loans. Support from a
small ‘beta’ group of friends and family filled seven loans within a few days, and the
African businesses began their start-up. Thanks to the work of Moses in Uganda, Kiva
came to life and the experiment expanded to other countries throughout the world.
From 2005 to 2010, it has facilitated over $118,414,735 in loans (with a repayment rate
of 98.27%) from more than 666,426 people who have helped or currently are helping
over 166,583 individuals in the developing world and the USA start or grow new
businesses.11
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Kiva’s design has two important features that make it a very efficient organization and
different from other ventures in social entrepreneurship. First, it partners with existing,
well-established microfinance institutions that have a critical knowledge of local popu-
lations and a long history of lending to the poor throughout the world. These institutions
must be registered with their respective governments and have regular internet access.
Partners are central to the microfinance process since they manage the loans in the com-
munities. They vet the loan applications, choose qualified borrowers, and then post the
borrower’s profile, including a photo of the entrepreneur, directly onto the Kiva.org
website. Lenders then review the website, pick a person (and his/her business), and
make a loan to the would-be entrepreneur for as little as $25 dollars using their credit
cards. Kiva.org then transfers lenders’ funds to its local partner by check or international
wire. The partner is responsible for managing the in-country loan which includes distri-
bution of the loan funds, collection of repayments, and provision of local support to entre-
preneurs in order to improve their chances of business success. Through the course of the
loan, usually 6–12 months, partners provide updates on the Kiva website, even direct
emails to the lenders from new business owners. When the loan is repaid, funds are
returned to the lenders who may withdraw or re-loan them to other businesses. Partners
do charge interest for their services to cover the transaction costs and currency risks,
but Kiva.org requires partners to fully disclose their interest rates and will not partner
with any organization that charges exorbitant rates.
Unlike other non-profits, Kiva has a very low overhead business thanks to its second
design feature—PayPal’s data-rich, transparent lending platform that tracks money and
delivers it throughout the lending cycle via the internet. As an official partner, PayPal
gives Kiva.org access to technology, research, workplace resources, and employee volun-
teers. In addition, it provides Kiva.org with free payment processing—Kiva’s largest vari-
able cost—enabling 100% of the loans to securely and seamlessly reach entrepreneurs in
the developing world. Thus, Kiva and its field partners have created a loan process that
operates efficiently and provides loans at cheaper rates compared with alternative
sources of debt capital.
As of 1 June 2007, Kiva’s website indicated loans to 299 businesses located in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Gaza, 210 of which are going to female entrepreneurs. Although some
of these websites are no longer active with Kiva, Figures 3 and 4 illustrate what two
sites looked like as of that date. Figure 3 represents an Iraqi entrepreneur from Kirkuk
whose identity (as with all Iraqi identities) had to be protected due to security risks.
The loans were administered by the Iraqi Al-Aman centre/Kirkuk, a non-governmental
organization registered at the ministry of civil society. The centre received funds from
the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) through the
IZDIHAR Project. The centre opened July of 2006 and was managed by a board of direc-
tors made up of well-known personnel with social and economic influence in the commu-
nity.12 Ariana Financial Services—Mercy Corps administers the loans in Afghanistan13
and the Shurush Initiative administered the loans in Gaza.14 Kiva also facilitated loans
in two other countries with ongoing peace operations—The Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Cote d’Ivoire. It also set up its loan process in countries that were still strug-
gling from the aftermath of war—Uganda, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. Although no
longer current on the website, we see in Figure 4 an example of an African entrepreneur
who lived with his family in an Internally Displaced People’s camp on the outskirts of
Kampala, Uganda, known as the Acholi Quarter.
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Implications of Kiva’s Model of Entrepreneurship for Peace Operations
Matthew Flannery and Jessica Jackley are excellent examples of entrepreneurs and fit the
generic model summarized in the first section. They developed a new idea—a global, inter-
net-based micro-loan process so individual lenders could support business entrepreneurs
in war-torn and developing regions—and they tested and nurtured its evolution through
the initiation, design, implementation, and institutionalization phases of the innovation
process. As social entrepreneurs, they created an efficient and effective social enterprise
called Kiva that facilitates and encourages business development throughout the world.
Their model of social entrepreneurship has four very salient implications for peace
operations. Each is explored in greater detail below: a supply chain that ‘contractually’
connects all the social actors in the loan process to minimize coordination problems and
ensure that each step in the workflow sequentially adds value; processes and systems
that guarantee work is transparent, efficient, and accountable; a model of learning that
Figure 3. Iraqi entrepreneur.
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enables global and local partners to co-create and sustain a complex, worldwide commu-
nity-based learning system in support of entrepreneurship; and a rich network of social
relations built from face-to-face and online interactions that helps generate social
capital needed for development.
Creation of a Supply Chain15
Kiva offers a solution to a very knotty problem of coordinating autonomous organizations
that locate in the same operational space for reconstruction and development work. Typi-
cally, organizations in peace operations jealously guard their autonomy and resist others’
efforts to exert any command and control authority over what they deem to be their sphere
of influence (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999; Roberts, 2010). Kiva avoids these interor-
ganizational squabbles and the ‘coordination nightmare’ that ensues (Reindorp & Wiles,
Figure 4. African entrepreneur.
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2001) by setting up a supply chain (Hugos, 2006) that ‘contractually’ connects all the
social actors in the loan process and ensures that each step in the workflow sequentially
adds value. For example, it begins with lenders who read detailed information about the
loan process on the website and then, if they agree with the terms, add value by lending
money to individual entrepreneurs around the world. Money is wired through PayPal
which adds value by facilitating the international transfer of money to areas that lack finan-
cial services institutions. In-country microfinance partners add value by helping fledgling
entrepreneurs develop a business plan and apply for a loan, vetting and recommending
applicants to Kiva donors, teaching entrepreneurs internet technology so they can commu-
nicate with donors, and ultimately, managing the loan repayment process.
Transparent, Efficient, and Accountable Work Practices
The supply chain approach to interorganizational coordination (Blanchard, 2007) helps
overcome another hurdle in peace operations that bedevils all participating organiz-
ations—ensuring work is transparent, efficient, and accountable. The Kiva website
monitors the details of all loans and posts them online for all to see—who owes what
money to whom for what purpose and for what period of time. Tracking each step in
the supply chain adds value and avoids unintended redundancy or overlap with other
steps in the chain. Overhead expenses are minimal and its greatest variable cost—
payment processing—is free, donated by PayPal. The staff of 34 full-time members,
described by name on Kiva’s website, oversees the entire worldwide loan process and
requires little overhead, enabling Kiva to run a very efficient operation. Its careful account-
ability reduces the opportunity for corruption that has siphoned off funds in other pro-
grammes in the developing world (Campos & Pradhan, 2007). Each entrepreneur
successfully completes an application process conducted by a local microfinance insti-
tution. Each microfinance institution has a partnership agreement with Kiva specifying
its duties and responsibilities for the distribution, administration, and collection of the
loans. In addition, each partner successfully completes Kiva’s due diligence requirements
before being given access to Kiva’s capital source. Box 2 lists Kiva’s criteria—drawn from
established microfinance institutions’ evaluation systems,16 leading industry pro-
fessionals’ opinions, and existing due diligence activities—for selecting, maintaining,
and evaluating field partners.
Kiva also evaluates its partners’ successes in making a significant social impact by
employing third-party assessments, its own regular evaluations, and a risk management
system to conduct this process. One of its major features is the ‘marketplace’ it has
created to encourage partners to compete for lenders’ funds by establishing and maintain-
ing a good reputation among the lenders and encouraging its lenders to consider the repu-
tation of field partners when deciding to loan. Box 3 summarizes the evaluation activities
Kiva conducts, its five-level risk management system, and its efforts to comply with inter-
national and local laws, especially anti-terror guidelines to hold itself and its partners
accountable.
A Worldwide Learning System in Support of Entrepreneurship
Another important implication of the Kiva model of social entrepreneurship for peace oper-
ations is its ability to learn and adapt to an ever-changing environment. The beta testing
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Box 2. Kiva’s criteria for selecting and maintaining field partners
Criteria for selection:
† Have a mission of lending to the poor for a social purpose.
† Have an established history of accountability and credibility with Kiva.org and
other organizations (e.g. US Peace Corps).
† Have low overall associated risk, high repayment history, and/or a loan loss
reserve fund.
† Be able to accept debt capital from US lenders.
† Sign Kiva.org’s Hosting Agreement.
† Be cleared of the US Department of Justice Terrorist Exclusion List and the Treas-
ury Department’s list of ‘Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons’.
† Provide Kiva.org with financial statements that indicate sound financial health.
† Provide Kiva.org with legal incorporation registration documents.
† Be capable of managing the currency risk in their region, as all Kiva.org loans are
granted and collected in US dollars.
† Offer a socially responsible interest rate to borrowers given their local economy
(i.e. significantly discounted in comparison with alternative options for low-
income borrowers with no collateral, credit history, etc.).
Criteria for continuation of partnership:
† Repayment rate.
† Journal frequency.
† Social impact (as measured by the impact assessment report provided on each
business at the end of the loan term).
conducted in Uganda and the experiments that probed the legal and administrative par-
ameters of its innovative idea are evidence that Kiva is a learning organization
(Argyris & Schon, 1978; Senge, 1990). Even more notable is its community-based
model of learning. Kiva has created an internet-facilitated, global community of interest
that lends money to entrepreneurs in the developing world, and through direct email con-
nections between lender and borrower, builds critical advice networks to support entrepre-
neurial ventures. The entrepreneurs learn better business practices through their
participation in the loan process and their personal online contacts with lenders.
Lenders learn about the challenges faced by people in the developing world and what
impact their targeted loans can make. If satisfied with the results of their initial loans,
lenders also learn the benefits of re-circulating money from repaid loans to support
new business ventures.
The learning continues at the local level when entrepreneurs become role models for
others in their communities to emulate. Initial media reports suggest that some local com-
munity members, observing the success of their neighbours, want to start up businesses
and begin applying for loans of their own. With this spillover effect, we have initial
evidence how a global, community-based learning process creates and sustains a local
learning process and how together the two establish a positive, reinforcing feedback
loop that builds a complex, worldwide, community-based learning system (Anderson &
Johnson, 1997) in support of entrepreneurship.
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Box 3. Kiva’s due diligence to measure field partners: trustworthiness, impact, and
accountability
Existing evaluations and standards:
† Microfinance industry data sources, such as the MIX Market, that are dedicated to
promoting transparency and improving reporting standards in the microfinance
industry.
† Awards and professional credit ratings such as MicroRate, Planet Rating, and
Microfinanza.
† Internal audits.
Evaluation activities conducted by Kiva.org:
† Collection of third-party validation from professional references, sponsors, and
local/international experts.
† Regular surveys of field partners to determine the partnership’s effectiveness.
† Periodical visits to random samples of borrowers to corroborate reported activities,
accomplishments, and results.
Limitation of risk:
† Each field partner is rated according to their size, history, sources of funding,
demonstrated ability to make repayments on time, and external evaluations.
† This rating determines their positioning within Kiva.org’s five-level risk-manage-
ment system that corresponds to the total credit extended to them each month.
† Kiva.org continually re-evaluates this rating according to a field partner’s perform-
ance; as field partners fulfil additional requirements and demonstrate reliability in
making repayments they are graduated to a higher rating level.
Compliance with anti-terror guidelines:
† Field partners must sign Kiva.org’s hosting agreement, which includes an anti-
terror clause requiring them to abide by laws regarding the prevention and detec-
tion of international money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
† The names of all field partner employees involved with Kiva.org are checked
against the U.S. Treasury Department’s list of ‘Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons’ and the Department of Justice’s Terrorist Exclusion List.
Source: www.kiva.org (accessed 10 February 2010).
Online and Community-Based Networks to Generate Social Capital
A fourth and final implication of the Kiva’s model of entrepreneurship for peace oper-
ations is its emphasis on social relationships. A series of relational links between the
lender and the borrower, between the lender (and teams of community lenders) and
Kiva, between the borrower and the Kiva Partner, and between the Kiva Partner and
Kiva, all forge a vibrant social network as Kiva illustrates with its online sociogram in
Figure 5. Studies of public- and private-sector entrepreneurs underscore the importance
of a relationally rich community base from which entrepreneurs need to draw in order to
develop and sustain their new ideas (Bollier, 1991; Downs, 1976; Gray, 1973; Kenny,
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2000; Lee, Miller & Hancock, 2000; Rogers, 1995; Saxenian, 1996; Walker, 1969).
Described as an ecology of organizational support (Roberts, 2007) and as incubators of entre-
preneurship (Bird, 1989, p. 157), government organizations, non-profits, and research centres
provide critical ‘social venture capital’ that is needed to encourage and promote both public
and private entrepreneurship and innovation. The same relational theme surfaces in the
reconstruction and development literature, but it is framed as the need for ‘bridging social
capital’—the cooperative interactions across ethnic, national, and religious lines that are
necessary for reconstruction and development to occur (Brinkerhoff & Mayfield, 2005;
Coletta & Cullen, 2000; Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Wollcock & Narayan, 2000).17
Kiva’s relational network—a rich community base of social relations that make entre-
preneurship and innovation more probable elsewhere—is the very thing that tends to be
missing in conflict areas, either because it never existed or it has been disrupted or
destroyed by the ravages of war. Kiva provides an interesting test case whether a
virtual community of interest can substitute for or be a complement to a local, face-to-
face community of interest in providing the necessary relational networks and the social
capital to jump start local enterprise in impoverished areas. Anecdotal evidence is sugges-
tive. Lenders find the Kiva model attractive because it enables them to establish almost a
‘personal relationship’ with the borrower thanks to the ‘high involvement’ features of the
website—pictures and descriptions of the entrepreneurs and their businesses along with
the ability to directly exchange emails with them. Lenders also establish relationships
with one another as illustrated in a posting for those interested in investing in Cambodia
(Figure 6). However, it remains to be seen whether microfinance internet-based connections
Figure 5. Example of Kiva’s network of field partners.
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will be enough to sustain individual entrepreneurs especially in areas where in-country infra-
structure and laws may not endorse or encourage their activities. It is likely that in-country
reforms will be needed to protect and encourage entrepreneurship, at the very least to
remove the roadblocks that limit its expansion. Whether Kiva broadens its scope and
scale to include such follow-on policy and infrastructure changes depends on the direction
its organizational learning takes in the future (Taylor, Dees & Emerson, 2002).
Conclusion
The social entrepreneurs Matthew Flannery and Jessica Jackley are exemplars of the generic
model of entrepreneurship drawn from the business and public sectors. Their new idea of an
internet-based loan process that enables person-to-person connections between lender and
borrower through the brokerage of Kiva and host-country partners has successfully
passed through all phases of the innovation process. The idea worked its way through
initiation into the design phase with the beta tests in Uganda. It then evolved into a full-
blown innovation implemented not only in Uganda, but later institutionalized throughout
the world to other countries in Africa, the Middle East, North, Central and South
America, and Asia. Their brand of entrepreneurship fits well within the generic model as
it extends from the private and public sectors into the citizen sector in war-torn areas.
Figure 6. Cambodian lending team.
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Kiva also appears to be an example of collective entrepreneurship as both entrepreneurs
collectively moved the new idea through the various stages of the innovation process. And
judging by the initial descriptions drawn from their website, Kiva provides some evidence
of functional entrepreneurship—in-country partners who are important functional special-
ists as idea generators, champions, advocates, administrators, and evaluators joining the
entrepreneurs to help establish the new businesses (Roberts, 1992, 2007; Roberts &
King, 1996). More systematic data gathering and analysis will be required to determine
the extent to which Kiva is an example of both collective and functional entrepreneur-
ship.18 Follow-on studies also will be required to determine whether the activity structure
of these social entrepreneurs is similar to that of other entrepreneurs.
Kiva does provide compelling evidence that entrepreneurship can and does exist during
peace operations. In this case, a successful social enterprise—Kiva—has given impetus to
business entrepreneurship in war-torn areas. Future research will be required to determine
if the second-order effect of their entrepreneurship fulfils its promise—the extent to which
the business entrepreneurs themselves successfully complete all phases of the innovation
process. What is evident at this juncture, however, is that the model of change embedded
in Kiva’s social entrepreneurship is a counter example to top-down, organization-centric,
mandate-driven intervention strategies characteristic of many organizations engaged in
peace operations (Holohan, 2005; Roberts & Bradley, 2005). Kiva has a light, less intru-
sive, human touch. Relationships and people-to-people connections are at its core; its strat-
egy is relation-centric not organization-centric. It is built from the bottom-up beginning
with ordinary people trapped in difficult circumstances who want to better their lives. Con-
necting with in-country partners and teams of international micro-lenders, fledgling in-
country entrepreneurs set the parameters of their ventures based on their interests and
capabilities. Thus, Kiva does not require government sponsorship or oversight, assume
large-scale projects with huge capital outlays, necessitate layers of bureaucracy to
oversee its loans, nor does it donate money or services. It facilitates micro-loans the
purpose of which is to enable individuals to become self-reliant and independent. The
model it espouses is based on the fundamental principle of all social entrepreneurship—
people are poor because they are living in constrained environments, not because they
lack the competence to improve their lives (Bornstein, 2006).
Although in its formative stages as a social enterprise, Kiva’s enduring legacy may very
well be the innovative model of intervention it offers to other organizations as they
prepare for their own entry into peace operations. Specifying the conditions under
which the model obtains will be an important next step in research and theory building.
In the meantime, thoughtful applications to other arenas such as education, health care,
and even military operations would be a good place to test its applicability beyond the
realm of microfinance.
Notes
1. Although definitions vary from country to country and organization to organization, a peace operation is
the United Nations’ generic term for three different approaches to international conflict. Peacemaking
deals with a conflict in progress and attempts to end it with the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peace-
keeping addresses traditional military operations and complex missions that incorporate military and
civilian efforts in the aftermath of war. Peace-building refers to activities that reintegrate combatants
into civilian society, strengthen the rule of law, improve respect for human rights, provide technical
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assistance for democratic development, etc. (Brahimi, 2000, pp. 2–3). For those interested in a more
elaborate typology, see McLean (1996).
2. Conflict tends to be the greatest during peacemaking when active conflict is involved and the post-
conflict period of peacekeeping.
3. Social entrepreneurs can come from all sectors, including business, but they predominantly come from
the non-profit sector.
4. Innovation phases do not imply a sequential logic in the idea’s trajectory. We know, for example, that the
more novel an innovative idea, the more overlap there tends to be among the phases. What this means in
practice is that when people work on highly original, innovative ideas, they may be engaged in both
initiation and design or design and implementation at the same time.
5. The phases of the innovation process describe innovation in global terms, stating the necessary con-
ditions for innovation to occur. If a new idea is not created, designed, and implemented, it will not be
able to attain the developed status we attribute to an innovation. In contrast, public entrepreneurs can
go through a much messier process that follows no predetermined set of activities. As Kingdon
(1984, p. 215) reminds us, ‘events do not proceed neatly in stages, steps, or phases. . . Participants do
not first identify problems and then seek solutions for them; indeed, advocacy of solutions often precedes
the highlighting of problems to which they become attached’. In fact, some would advocate this messi-
ness, by encouraging public entrepreneurs to work on implementation issues while they are creating and
designing new policy (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).
6. See for example, the Kiva.org website: http://kiva.org/ (accessed 8 June 2007).
7. See the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping website: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ accessed June
2, 2007.
8. See Ashoka’s website: http://ashoka.org/ (accessed 7 February 2010).
9. There is a debate whether social entrepreneurs must be driven to innovate for the purpose of social
change and transformation or whether the pursuit of ‘regular’ innovations is sufficient to call
someone a social entrepreneur. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address this issue, but it is an
important one in sorting through the competing definitions of social entrepreneurship.
10. Unless otherwise indicated, all material from this section of the paper is taken from Kiva’s website http://
kiva.org/ (accessed 8 June 2007).
11. http://www.kiva.org/about/facts/ (accessed on 3 February 2010).
12. http://www.kiva.org/app.php?page=about&action=aboutPartner&id=50 (accessed 8 June 2007).
13. http://www.kiva.org/app.php?page=about&action=aboutPartner&id=34 (accessed 8 June 2007).
14. http://www.kiva.org/app.php?page=about&action=aboutPartner&id=2 (accessed 8 June 2007).
15. The supply chain graphical display and video—‘The Story of a Kiva Loan’—can be found at http://www.
kiva.org/about/how (accessed 7 February 2010).
16. For more information on these systems, see the Microfinance Standards Initiative at http://www.
seepnetwork.org/Pages/Initiatives/FinancialReportingStandardInitiative.aspx
17. Social capital is a contested concept (Adler & Kwon, 2002). The definition used herein draws from
Putnam (1993) and distinguishes between bonding social capital that predisposes people to work
cooperatively within their community of interest and bridging social capital that enables them to
work cooperatively between and among communities of interest.
18. These two forms of collective entrepreneurship (team and functional) are sometimes difficult to dis-
tinguish in the field. Longitudinal studies are necessary to separate functional experts who are activated
at certain stages of the innovation process and entrepreneurial teams who work collaboratively through
all stages of the policy innovation process.
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